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Under the National Banking System (NBS), in eﬀect from 1863–1914, na-
tional banks that deposited suﬃcient collateral could issue notes provided
they paid a tax on notes in circulation: 1% per year prior to 1900 and 1
2%
thereafter (see, for example, Friedman and Schwartz [6], pp. 20–23). The
simple and predominant view of this system uses the observation that note
issue was far below the allowed maximum and an arbitrage argument to pre-
dict that the system should have produced a low and constant upper bound
on short-term nominal interest rates—a bound equal to the tax rate on notes
outstanding (see, in particular, Champ, Wallace, and Weber [4]). The easi-
est way to understand the arbitrage argument is by way of an analogy to a
central-bank discount window that makes loans on demand at an interest rate
equal to the tax rate subject to a collateral requirement. So long as eligible
collateral exceeds the amount used as collateral, the collateral requirement
does not impose a cost. Therefore, such a system produces a perfectly elastic
supply of money at an interest rate (on safe loans) equal to the tax rate—
perfectly elastic up to the quantity at which all eligible collateral is used as
collateral. Unfortunately, as is well known and documented in Champ, Wal-
lace, and Weber, data on interest rates contradict that prediction: the data
suggest the presence of arbitrage proﬁts. That is the note-issue puzzle.
Champ, Wallace, and Weber suggested a route to resolving the puzzle.
They said that the questionable ingredient in the arbitrage argument is the
assumption that banks could earn the market rate of interest on any quantity
of notes they chose to issue. In particular, the rules concerning note issue
and redemption suggest that issuing notes to buy securities in the markets
of ﬁnancial centers was unproﬁtable. Such notes would almost certainly be
presented for redemption in a matter of days and the redemption processing
costs, which were charged to the issuing bank, would more than oﬀset the
interest earned even at interest rates far in excess of the tax rate.1 In terms
of the discount-window analogy, it is as if the discount-window loans take the
form of identiﬁable notes—say, by serial numbers—and that whenever such
notes pass through the clearing system, the borrowing bank has its reserves
and its discount-window debt reduced by the amount of such notes. (In
other words, the discount-window loans are callable with calls determined by
1Friedman and Schwartz hint at aspects of this when they say “An issuing bank ... had
no way of identifying banks that returned its notes to the Treasury for redemption; hence
its New York City correspondents could do so with impunity.” ([6], footnote 8, page 21.)
2whether the notes show up in the clearing system.) In this paper, we pursue
that suggestion.2 Indeed, we pursue it in an extreme way.
We study the proﬁtability of note-issue in a model in which notes play a
role, but in which there is no securities market. In the model, a variant of
the Cavalcanti-Wallace model of inside money (see [2] and [3]), the beneﬁt
of note issue is that of having a credit line: a note issuer’s current spending
is less tied to recent earnings than is that of a non issuer. The cost is the
tax rate levied on outstanding notes. Neither, by construction, depends on
anything that resembles a market rate of interest. Hence, an equilibrium in
which there is indiﬀerence between issuing and not issuing notes does not
pin down a market interest rate.
We ﬁrst describe the sense in which the observations look like there was
indiﬀerence between issuing national bank notes and not issuing them. Then
we present the model. Finally, we comment on the association—or lack
thereof—between entities in the model and entities in the actual NBS econ-
omy. As part of that discussion, we comment on what is missing from the
model, including a market in securities, and provide guesses about the con-
sequences of a model that would incorporate some of what is missing.
2 Under-issuance of Notes
During the period of the NBS, national banks could issue bank notes backed
by holdings of eligible U.S. governent bonds (see Huntington and Mawhin-
ney [7] for the complete set of laws governing national banks). Upon the
deposit of eligible bonds with the U.S. Treasury, a national bank would re-
ceive an amount of bank notes equal to 90% (100% after March 14, 1900) of
the par or market value, whichever was less, of the deposited bonds. National
banks were required to redeem their own notes in lawful money—specie or
greenbacks—and to accept the notes of other banks at par. After 1874, in
order to facilitate the redemption process, national banks were required to
maintain a redemption fund with the U.S. Treasury equal to 5% of their
2Redemption costs are also the subject of Champ, Freeman, and Weber [5]. However,
they do not build on the central idea of this paper, which is that a bank could inﬂuence
how quickly notes would be presented for redemption by the use to which it put newly
issued notes. Their approach, which delivers a version of the arbitrage argument adjusted
for average costs and rates of redemption, is not consistent with the conclusion that any
direct attempt to arbitrage by using notes to buy securities in ﬁnancial markets was almost
certain to generate a loss.
3outstanding circulation. A bank that desired to redeem the notes of another
national bank could ship the notes to the U.S. Treasury or any assistant
treasurer’s oﬃce and an equal amount of lawful money would be returned,
paid out of the issuing bank’s redemption fund. The costs associated with
the redemption process were charged to the issuing bank.
2.1 State banks
There were straightforward rules and requirements for obtaining a charter to
become a national bank. Initially, there seemed to be an expectation that
most state banks would seek such charters. But that never happened. Even
though the Act of 1865, which imposed a 10% tax on state bank notes, led
to the disappearance of state bank notes, it never led to the demise of state
banks. In 1860, the total number of state banks stood at 1,562; by 1868,
only 247 state banks remained (Barnett [1], p. 11). However, this trend
was short-lived. According to Friedman and Schwartz [6], p. 19, “By 1867,
the decline in the deposits of state and private banks had ceased. These
banks then expanded so rapidly that by 1871 the deposits of non national
commercial banks equaled national bank deposits.” The existence of a large
state banking system which does not have the note issuance privilege is one
sense in which note issue seemed not to be proﬁtable.
2.2 Under-issuance by national banks
There are two senses in which national banks themselves did not fully exploit
the opportunity to issue notes. First, as is widely known, they never held
all the eligible bond collateral required as backing for note issue. Prior to
1900, national banks held only 20–30% of the eligible bond collateral. After
1900, when the tax on note issue was eﬀectively lowered to 1
2% per year
and the amount of notes that could be issued for a given bond deposit was
increased from 90% to 100%, the proportion of eligible collateral held as
backing increased steadily to over 80% by 1914.
Second, national banks frequently did not issue circulation up to the
amount possible, given their actual holdings of eligible collateral. Further-
more, some national banks chose not to issue notes at all. In each annual
report during the period, the Comptroller of the Currency presented a table
of non-issuing national banks. Several relatively large New York City banks
appeared frequently in these tables. Table 1 presents information on these
4banks, including the years in which those banks did not issue notes.3 These
banks typically held the minimum amount of government bonds as backing
required by law and issued no notes against those holdings.
Table 1. Non-Issuing New York City National Banks
Bank Capital Relative Period of
National Bank to Average Bank Capitala Non-Issue
American Exchange N. B. 25.2 1881–1889
Chemical National Bank 1.5 1868–1905
Fulton National Bank 2.5 1868–1887
Mechanics’ National Bank 11.1 1881–1903
Merchants’ National Bank 11.9 1889–1905
National City Bank 4.6 1868–1892
National Park Bank 10.8 1888–1892
Third National Bank 5.0 1881–1888
aThis column represents a measure of the size of each listed bank relative to a typical
national bank. The capital of each listed bank was divided by the average capital across
all banks. This ratio was then averaged across the years the listed bank did not issue
notes.
3 The model
We ﬁrst set out the environment. Then, because the above observations
strongly suggest that there were not net beneﬁts to participating in note
issue under the NBS, we describe the conditions for a steady state which is
internal in the sense that not everyone eligible to issue notes does so.
3.1 The environment
The Cavalcanti-Wallace model uses a version of the background environment
of Shi [8] and Trejos and Wright [9]. Time is discrete and the horizon is
3Table 1 presents information solely on New York City non-issuing national banks.
There were other large and small banks across the country that did not issue notes during
the period. However, the number of non-issuing national banks never exceeded 1% of
banks. We thank James Thomson for emphasizing the existence of non-issuing banks and
for originally assembling the raw data.
5inﬁnite. There are S > 2 perishable goods at each date and a [0,1] continuum
of each of S types of people. A type s person consumes only good s and is able
to produce only good s + 1 (modulo S). Each person maximizes expected
discounted utility with discount parameter β ∈ (0,1). The period utility
function is u(x) − y, where x is consumption of the relevant good and y
is production of the relevant good. The function u is strictly concave and
increasing, and satisﬁes u(0) = 0, u0(0) = ∞, and u0(∞) = 0.
Cavalcanti and Wallace split the [0,1] continuum of each type into two
intervals. The interval [0,A] consists of those whose previous actions are
perfectly monitored, and, therefore, are common knowledge. We call them
the “known” people. The rest, the interval (A,1], are not monitored at all
so their previous actions are private. We refer to them as the “unknown”
people. The parameter A can be interpreted as society’s monitoring capac-
ity. A person’s specialization type and known-unknown status are common
knowledge and people cannot commit to future actions.
In Cavalcanti and Wallace [2], each known person has a printing press.
The printing press turns out uniform, indivisible, and perfectly durable ob-
jects called notes. The notes of any person can be distinguished from those
of any other person. These notes are the only durable assets. Finally, each
person can carry from one date to the next at most one note. We maintain
these assumptions.
In the original version of the model, each person meets one person per
date at random. So, for example, an unknown person meets another such
person with probability 1−A and meets a known person with probability A.
Here, we change the meeting pattern slightly in a way which is innocuous for
our purposes and which simpliﬁes the model a bit. We assume that unknown
people meet others at random as in the original model, but known people
never meet each other.
3.2 Simple stationary allocations
We limit consideration to pure strategy steady states and to allocations which
do not depend on the specialization type, s, and which are simple in other
respects that we now describe. In Cavalcanti-Wallace, all known people were
assumed to behave the same way. Here, because the goal is an outcome in
which some known people issue notes and others do not, we let λ denote the
fraction of known people who participate in the note-issuing scheme. The
participants can issue notes, must redeem notes, and must pay a tax on notes
6outstanding. The non-participants, the fraction 1 − λ of the known people,
use notes of participants and are not subject to the tax.
One of our simplifying assumptions is that a producer in a single-coin-
cidence meeting is given a note whenever that is feasible. Subject to the
condition that there are no gifts (of notes or output), such a trade pattern
gives rise to as much trade as is possible given the assumptions about produc-
tion and consumption opportunities and the unit bound on note holdings. A
consequence of that trade pattern is that there is a unique steady-state distri-
bution of notes: half of the non-participants and half of the unknown people
have a note. Therefore, the outstanding stock of notes (per specialization
type) is 1−λA
2 .
Cavalcanti and Wallace study somewhat general allocations in which
notes can have one value in terms of goods when issued, another value
when traded among unknown people, and still another value when redeemed.
(They also allow for the possibility that known people are forced to give gifts
of output or notes.) We build in the observation that NBS notes always
traded at par and were redeemed at par and that it was not part of the sys-
tem to force known people to give gifts. Therefore, we assume a single value
of a note in terms of output, a value denoted y. Thus, for us, an allocation
is a pair (y,λ).
In terms of output, the value of the notes outstanding is y 1−λA
2 , which
is the total tax base. We assume that each participant pays a tax equal to
τy 1−λA
2λA , where τ is the tax rate. That is, the tax base for each participant is
the per participant value of notes outstanding. We assume that tax revenue
disappears.4
3.3 Conditions for an internal steady-state
We now set out the conditions for existence of a steady state with λ ∈ (0,1),
one with both participants and non-participants. We begin by describing
expected discounted utilities at the start of a date as functions of λ and y.
Although the crucial conditions for an internal steady state depend on those
for participants and non-participants, we begin with those for the unknown
people. They are relevant for participation constraints which limit the set of
possible y’s.
4A version in which such taxes are paid out as lump-sum gifts from note-issuer pro-
ducers to unknown consumers in meetings would not be siginiﬁcantly diﬀerent for “low”
tax rates.
7We let vuj denote expected discounted utility of an unknown person with
j notes at the start of a date, prior to meetings, and let ∆u ≡ vu1 − vu0.
These values satisfy
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[u(y) − β∆u], (2)
where λA
S is the frequency of meetings with participant producers and of
meetings with participant consumers and where 1−λA
2S is the frequency of
meetings with other producers without a note and of meetings with other
consumers with a note.
For the above kind of allocation, a participant has no state. Thus, we let
vk denote expected utility of a participant. This satisﬁes







where z(y) ≡ u(y) − y. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents the
expected payoﬀ coming from meetings with unknown people and the second
term taxes on notes outstanding.
Finally, we describe expected discounted utilities for non-participants.
We let ˜ vkj denote the discounted expected utility of a non-participant with
j notes and let ˜ ∆k = ˜ vk1 − ˜ vk0. These satisfy
(1 − β)˜ vk0 =
1 − A
2S
[−y + β ˜ ∆k] (4)
and
(1 − β)˜ vk1 =
1 − A
2S
[u(y) − β ˜ ∆k]. (5)
In each case, the right-hand side represents the expected payoﬀ coming from
meetings with unknown people.
For the purpose of comparing the value of participating to that of not
participating and consistent with a steady state analysis, we take the payoﬀ
of a non-participant to be the expected value of ˜ vk0 and ˜ vk1. Because the
steady state has half of non-participants with a note and half without a
8note, that expected value, denoted ˜ vk , is the simple average of ˜ vk0 and ˜ vk1.
Therefore, from (4) and (5), we have




From (3) and (6), we have







The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side represents the gain to participating. The
gain is more frequent trade with unknown people: the ability of participants
to issue notes makes trade more frequent because it makes their current
trades less dependent on their recent trades.5 The cost to participating is










This last condition is one of the requirements for an internal solution for λ.
Finally, we set out the constraints coming from the requirement that no
one in the model can commit to future actions. In keeping with the NBS
rules, we assume that trades by unknown people and by non-participants
are voluntary, but that a participant who fails to redeem a note is severely
punished. These are expressed by imposing that unknown people and non-
participants always get non-negative gains from trade, but that participants
are punished by permanent autarky for failing to redeem a note. These
participation restrictions are
y ≤ β∆u ≤ u(y), (9)






where the ﬁrst pertains to unknown people, the second to non-participants,
and the third to participants. Because the v’s are uniquely determined by y
5This is the basis for the result in Cavalcanti and Wallace [2] that inside money achieves
strictly more outcomes than outside money.
9and λ, these are restrictions on y and λ. In general, they are more stringent
the smaller is β.
We now have all the requirements for existence of an internal steady
state. Any (y,λ) with λ ∈ (0,1) that implies v’s that satisfy (1)–(11) is such
a steady state. Although the quantitative implications of the model should
not be taken seriously, we present an example for which we compute τ∗ for
λ near 1
2, just to illustrate one way to use the equilibrium conditions. A
somewhat neutral choice of y is to set it at the unconstrained maximum of z,
denoted y∗. Then, if we let u(x) = x1/2, a simple function that has been used
before in related models, we have y∗ = z(y∗) = 1
4. Next, we set S = 3—the
smallest S consistent with no double coincidences. We let A = 0.1, to reﬂect
the idea that most people in the NBS economy would not have qualiﬁed
for credit lines from banks. These choices, any suﬃciently high β, and any
λ ∈ (0,1) satisfy the participation constraints. Then, (8) implies that for
values of λ near 1
2, tax rates near 0.8% are consistent with an internal steady
state.
4 The model and the NBS economy
On the surface, the above model bears little resemblance to the NBS economy.
Therefore, we now discuss how we associate entities in the model with entities
in that economy. We also discuss some of what is missing from the model—
notably outside money and markets in securities.
4.1 Notes and note issuers
The notes in the model look like payable-to-the-bearer, trade-credit instru-
ments. In the model, notes get into circulation only when an unknown per-
son without a note produces for a participant and receives a note. They
get redeemed when an unknown person receives goods from a participant
in exchange for a note. Thus, notes do not get into circulation through
the granting of loans by participants and are not redeemed by way of the
repayment of loans.
Given those aspects of notes in the model, in order to identify them with
NBS notes, we interpret the set of participants in the model as a consolidation
of note-issuing NBS banks and their customers who borrow in the form of
notes. (Strictly speaking, this interpretation only works if note-issuing NBS
10banks had balance sheets consisting of nothing more than notes as liabilities
and loans in the form of notes as assets.) Several comments are in order
about this interpretation.
First, in the actual NBS economy, note-issuing banks were sometimes
asked to redeem notes for lawful money. Although lawful money (outside
money) could be added to the model, we have chosen not to do so here.
Instead, the model has redemption for goods. In terms of unconsolidated
entities, we can associate redemption in the model with the following two-
part transaction involving a banker: when a note is presented to a banker for
redemption in goods, the banker calls in a loan which the borrower repays in
goods. Second, there is no collateral requirement for note issue in the model.
This omission is justiﬁed by the fact, described above, that the collateral
restriction was not binding in the aggregate: the amount of eligible collateral
exceeded the amount used as collateral. In any case, this omission tends
to make note issue in the model more attractive. Third, note issue in the
model is like a credit line with a nonbinding limit. This, again, tends to
make note issue in the model more attractive than it probably was in the
NBS economy. Fourth, this interpretation obviates the need to be concerned
about how NBS note-issuing banks shared the gains from note issue with
those who borrowed in the form of notes. Loans are complicated contracts
and borrowers who accepted loans in the form of notes rather than in the
form of lawful money may have gotten more favorable terms on their loans.
In our interpretation, these loans net out and do not need to be considered.
Finally, and most important, if note issue was proﬁtable for NBS banks, then
it should have been proﬁtable for the consolidated entity consisting of the
bank and its customers who borrow in the form of notes; after all, those who
borrowed in the form of notes from NBS banks should not have incurred
losses by engaging in such borrowing.
There is, however, one very unattractive aspect of the model. In (8),
τ∗(y,λ) is increasing in λ. Therefore, across steady states, there is a positive
association between the tax rate and participation in the note-issue scheme.
This arises because the beneﬁt of note issue does not depend on the out-
standing stock or λ, while the cost in the form of taxes is decreasing in λ.
(The total outstanding stock is decreasing in λ and the per-participant share
of a given stock is decreasing in λ.) The positive association would be over-
turned if the beneﬁt was suﬃciently increasing in the outstanding stock per
participant. It would be increasing if note issuers were acquiring assets when
they issued notes. In the model, note issuers consume when they issue a
11note. Therefore, there is no continuing pay-oﬀ associated with the outstand-
ing stock. That being so, perhaps we should not have levied the tax on the
outstanding stock. We did so to mimic the actual NBS rules.
4.2 Outside money and markets in securities
It is tempting to try to add outside money to the model and to allow for
trade in securities. Then the rate of interest in that market could with some
justiﬁcation be identiﬁed with the interest rates in the ﬁnancial markets
under the NBS. Adding outside money to the model creates no problems: it
is easy to get unknown people to treat outside money and notes as perfect
substitutes. Adding a market in securities raises complications that we do
not see how to deal with at this time.
The market should resemble the commercial paper market. In terms of
the people in the model, it would make sense to allow all known people to
be borrowers in this market—i.e., to be issuers of commercial paper. To be
consistent with the claim made above that NBS note issuers would not want
to use newly issued notes to buy commercial paper, there should be a reason
why borrowers in that market should want to acquire outside money and not
notes. We do not yet see how to easily motivate that demand. (In the NBS
economy, national banks could not use notes as reserves against deposits.)
As regards lenders, the informational structure would allow anyone to lend
in this market. However, it is tempting to exclude unknown people simply
as part of the assumed exogenous meeting structure. If all of that were
done, then the market would be a source of liquidity for all known people,
whether they were participants in the note-issuing scheme or not. If anything,
it would seem that this source of added liquidity would be more valuable to
non-participants than to participants. Thus, a market structured in that way
would tend to reduce the beneﬁts of participating in the note issue scheme.
It would certainly not restore the possibility of arbitrage between notes and
securities.
4.3 Other restrictive assumptions
In the model, the only form of inside money is notes. In the actual NBS
economy, known people could have had a credit line against which they could
write checks. If the model allowed for that possibility, then it would provide
another alternative to participation in the note-issue scheme. Also, the value
12of the credit line in the form of notes that is in the model seems, if anything,
to be enhanced by the assumptions that notes are indivisible and that peo-
ple can hold at most one unit. In the model, non-participants are severely
constrained by the upper bound on note holdings, while participants are not
at all constrained by that bound. Therefore, weakening that bound would
seem to reduce the net beneﬁts of participating in the note issue scheme.
In the model, we treat participation as a once-for-all decision. That, in
turn, justiﬁes levying a tax on per participant notes outstanding, because
the per participant amount is the expected value of the tax base for each
participant. Given our view of the role of notes, we think this once-for-all
aspect of the decision to participate is sensible. If NBS notes were issued to
customers for the purpose of working capital, then the amount issued for that
purpose could not be easily adjusted. Banks, instead, would decide whether
they wanted to be in that business and, if so, would stand ready to make
loans in the form of notes.
5 Concluding Remarks
Although our model can display an internal solution for note issue, we have
to admit that we have only pointed out a direction toward resolving the note-
issue puzzle. First, our paper rests on the view that using newly issued notes
in organized ﬁnancial markets was unproﬁtable. Conceivably, additional di-
rect evidence about the validity of that view could be mustered. Second,
even if that view is accepted, a resolution should simultaneously describe the
organized ﬁnancial markets and the role of NBS notes. We have described a
role for notes when there are no organized markets. At best, our model is a
picture of an economy in which there is a complete separation between trade
in NBS notes and trade in organized ﬁnancial markets. Obviously, that is
too extreme a view.
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